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1 Introduction
This paper attempts to explore some of the ethical issues inherent in the concept of
“Emissions Trading” (ET). While it is fairly novel in terms of practical application,
the instrument has gained enormous publicity and importance since the adoption of
the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. Alongside the “meaningful participation” of
Developing Countries, the inclusion of Emissions Trading in the Protocol was a top
priority of the US and was of vital importance for other industrialised countries and
for Russia. In fact, the question almost brought down the negotiations during the last
night in Kyoto (Oberthür/Ott 1999, 188 et seq.). Afterwards the international
process came to a standstill until the Parties to the Framework Convention agreed on
a timetable for the resolution of the outstanding issues — the so-called “Buenos
Aires Plan of Action”.
According to this timetable, agreement on elaborated rules for Emissions Trading
and the other instruments (Joint Implementation (JI), Article 6, and the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), Article 12) should be achieved at the Sixth
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in The Hague, November 2000 (COP 6).
The post-Kyoto process was — and still is — driven by the knowledge that without
agreement on these instruments the Kyoto Protocol will not enter into force. Many
of the expectations and opinions expressed on this subject must be seen against this
background.
The “trading” of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is an integral part of the so-called
“flexibility mechanisms”. These mechanisms were designed to facilitate the
fulfilment of the quantified targets set out in the Kyoto Protocol and to lower the
overall costs of complying with the Protocol (Grubb 1999; Oberthür/Ott 1999). In
theory, Emissions Trading is an instrument for reaching maximum efficiency of
abatement efforts. Countries differ with regard to their marginal abatement costs
because of their different dependence on production activities that emit GHGs, their
relative resource efficiency and their dependence on and access to energy sources
(coal, gas etc.). Under these conditions, each entity obliged to reduce emissions by a
fixed amount is supposed to gain from trade, as long as costs differ between those
two entities (Edmonds/Scott et al. 1999).
Due to the political struggles in Kyoto, only rudimentary provisions on Emissions
Trading have been incorporated into the Protocol itself. The basic mechanism is
simple: any country that stays below the limit of the binding limitation and reduction
obligations established in Article 3.1 and Annex B may transfer the difference to
another Party. The “assigned amount” of emissions that is transferred is then
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subtracted from the allowed emissions of the seller-country and added to that of the
buyer-country (Article 3 paragraphs 10 and 11). Article 17 of the Protocol
completes this design with just three sentences: the Conference of the Parties (COP)
of the Convention shall define the detailed rules; only Parties included in Annex B
may participate in ET; and trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions.
These statements clarify that only Parties with binding limitation and reduction
obligations will be able to participate in trading, since Annex B sets out the
differentiated targets for each country. The quantitative “cap” is vital for the
economic functioning of any trading regime and should ensure that overall
emissions with trading do not exceed those without trading (save the “hot air” from
Eastern European countries, see below). Most issues have been left unresolved,
however. These unresolved issues include, inter alia, the time when trading might
start, the definition of participants (i.e. whether private entities will be allowed to
trade), which part of the Kyoto obligations may be achieved through trading
(supplementarity) and the regulations regarding monitoring, verification and,
ultimately, enforcement of the rules. Similarly, all institutional and procedural
aspects of the trading regime will have to be developed. These more technical issues
are elaborated elsewhere. (Bohm 1998; Edmonds/Scott et al. 1999; Grubb 1989 and
1999; Missfeldt 1998; Oberthür/Ott 1999).
For the purposes of the present paper, we will instead concentrate on some core
questions regarding issues that tend to be neglected in the negotiations, which are
usually more concerned with diplomatic manoeuvres and legal technicalities.  We
will focus on some of the ethical assumptions upon which an Emissions Trading
architecture would rest. We proceed along core questions in building an ET system
that, in our opinion, involve ethical decisions.
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2 Why reduction targets?
Any Emissions Trading system rests on mutually agreed reduction or limitation
targets. These targets define the overall volume of permissible emissions available
for trade. Setting such limits requires an major commitment on behalf of all partners
in the process. The ethical reasons, which sustain these commitments, therefore have
a defining power and are likely to shape successive decisions as well. Although
reduction targets are the common result of any approach, the storylines underlying
these ethical reasons may differ considerably. For the purpose of the present
discussion, we distinguish four storylines, entitled “avoiding threats”, “optimising
a resource”, “holding in trust”, and “respecting fellow-beings”. A fifth one, called
“rejoicing in creation” could be added, but is not considered here.
Optimising a resource
From a conventional economic perspective, the natural world appears as a storehouse
of resources to be turned into value. Nature provides the sources, sites, and sinks for
industrial activity, which produces valuable goods and services for consumers.
However, neither the depletion of sources nor the degradation of sites or the
overflow of sinks are accounted for in the books; nature is considered a free and
potentially infinite good. External costs to nature become a problem only if
somebody else’s property is impaired. The rest falls into oblivion, overshadowed by
the perceived duty of economic actors to increase efficiency in a competitive market.
Against this backdrop, the story-line “optimizing a resource” speaks about the
failure of the narrow pursuit of self-interest and calls for collective rules instead.
Egocentric ethics gives way to utilitarian ethics (Merchant 1990), which advocates
the regulation of individual action in the name of the greater good of a greater
number of people for a longer period of time.  From a utilitarian perspective, the
global atmosphere is seen as a sink that overflows because of its uncoordinated use
by competitive, growth-producing economies. Regulation is regarded as necessary,
because the accumulating of emissions over and above the capacity of the sink may
eventually undermine the prospects of further economic progress. Such regulation
will have to curb individual tendencies to enlarge economic power. Optimising
advantages for everybody in the long run by limiting the maximisation of advantage
by everybody in the short run is the economic rationale for setting reduction targets.
As a consequence, the selection of targets will have to be guided by a utilitarian
calculus of aggregate benefits and costs rather than the individual actor’s self-
interest.
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Avoiding threats
Protecting the climate for protecting humans is the most widely accepted storyline
underlying reduction commitments. As climate change may endanger possessions,
health, and even survival, in particular of the weaker sections of the world population,
many stakeholders call for action. Thus, perceived vulnerability is the reason for
ethical commitment.  In contrast to conflicts about, say, the conservation of forests,
what is at stake is not in the first place the protection of nature from man, but the
protection of man from nature.
Invoking threats to everyday security makes people listen. It is the strength of this
storyline to offer a vocabulary by which consensus can be forged even in a morally
indifferent world.  After all, moral consensus is difficult to come by in contemporary
society, since the grand ethical narratives which once told about “progress”,
“solidarity” or the “right social order” have withered away. In fact as the
anthropologist Mary Douglas (1990) once noted, the concern for security and
survival offers some of the last forensic resources available to muster support for
common action in a post-ethical society. When shared norms about society fade, the
concern for security is the only common concern left. Referring to security appeals
to the common good, but to a common good stripped to its bones. As a result,
necessity, not hope motivates action.
Holding in trust
With its formulation “protecting the climate system for the benefit of present and
future generations”, the FCCC refers back to a concept which has gradually come to
the fore since the Conference on the Environment in Stockholm 1972. The well-
being of future generations is supposed to enter into the set of factors to be
considered for decision-making in the present. While for decades posteriority had
only figured as future beneficiaries of progress, it now emerges as a possible victim
of it. Justice across generations demands restraint today. The concept extends the
principle of equity among the human community along the axis of time.
Climate protection in this storyline is a matter of rebalancing relations among people
rather than between people and nature. It views the human community as a
partnership among all generations – the living, the dead, and the unborn. For this
reason, this storyline looks at the Earth as a trust, passed on to us by our ancestors,
to be enjoyed, and passed on to our descendants for their own use (Brown Weiss
1992, 395). Just as the rights of the previous generation were matched by their
duties to the present one, the rights of the present generation are matched by their
duties to the subsequent generation. Being a beneficiary of the global commons
today, therefore, also implies being their trustee. It is from a sense of identity that
extends across time that concerns for climate as a common heritage emerges. To
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what extent, however, will an age, which eagerly breaks its ties with the past, be able
to establish ties with the future? This is the conundrum of this storyline.
Respecting fellow-beings
So far, the ethical frames presented have had a clear anthropocentric slant. The
welfare of humans, today as well as tomorrow, has been the focus of attention. In
contrast, this storyline starts with the assumption that humans are not entitled to
inflict climate change upon the communities of plants and animals, which — along
with humans and inanimate matter — make up the biosphere. In this account, non-
human beings have rights as well. They have not just instrumental, but also intrinsic
value. Climate, it can be said, has standing because it is essential to the flourishing of
many species. Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, which sees man/woman as a fellow of
soils, waters, plants and animals, can be also applied to the largest community, the
biosphere. Leopold’s words can be used with regard to global warming: “A thing is
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, beauty, and stability of the biotic
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise”.
This affirmation remains valid even if one subscribes to a more dynamic concept of
nature. The more nature is seen as self-organizing, disorderly, and partly
unpredictable, the less interference by humans is in order. To live in partnership
would imply to respect nature’s freedom as an autonomous agent. Extending this
line of argument to the realm of worldviews, it could be added that the perception of
nature as an autonomous agent that is not part of the man-made world is engrained
in many cultures, including the West. The prospect that there may no longer be such
a thing as a natural weather event is deeply unsettling for this perspective.
Obviously, these four conceptions are not mutually exclusive. However, they do
imply a gradient. Reading from 1 to 4, they increasingly afford more weight to the
value of ecological effectiveness. As choices arise in the climate debate which have to
balance ecological effectiveness against economic efficiency and equity, positions
taken on these points will shape the outcome of the choices.
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3 Who should have reduction obligations?
The climate regime has been vexed from its inception by the question of
participation of developing countries in the effort to control greenhouse gases.
Whereas in principle any effective strategy will require universal participation in the
long run, considerations of historical responsibility, the polluter pays principle, the
imbalance regarding adverse effects of climate change and the unequal capabilities
between North and South call for a differentiated approach.
Under the FCCC, developed countries are requested to take the lead in combating
climate change. Art. 3.1 reads as follows: “The Parties should protect the climate
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis
of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” The text offers
no explicit justification, but it is not difficult to identify four different reasons for
this clause. First, industrialised countries are responsible for the bulk of carbon
dioxide emissions accumulated in the past; some 80% of the rise in cumulative
emissions since 1800 are caused by developed countries. Second, in 1996 developed
countries were responsible for 61.5% (UNDP 1998, 202) of global carbon dioxide
emissions. The fact that the emissions of the South will surpass those of the North
sometime after 2020 (IEA 1998a) does not basically change this picture. Third, the
adverse effects of global warming are going to be distributed unequally between
North and South; those who cause the problem are — in relative terms — likely to
be the winners, and those who have been the bystanders are likely to be the victims.
Fourth, developed countries possess more capabilities to respond to climate change,
at least with regard to financial resources and technical ingenuity.
The Convention largely attributes responsibility according to the “polluter pays”
principle. As a consequence, Article 4.2 of the FCCC contains a loosely worded
non-binding commitment by industrialised countries to “aim” at returning their
emissions to 1990 levels (Bodansky 1993; Oberthür/Ott 1999, 34 et seq.).
Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol, according to its letter, contains quantified targets for
those industrialised countries listed in Annex B only, despite repeated attempts by
the US and other non-European industrialised countries to achieve some substantive
commitment from developing countries. These attempts will continue and
occasionally disrupt negotiations, but will ultimately fail. Nevertheless, there is little
doubt that quantitative commitments for the biggest and most advanced developing
countries will be on the agenda for negotiations on the second commitment period,
i.e. from 2005 onwards (cf. Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol).
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In any case, in envisaging climate-friendly scenarios for the next century, it is helpful
to distinguish two distinct trajectories across a variety of initial conditions starting
from the two opposite poles (GCI 1999; Shukla 1999). Generally speaking,
industrial countries start their trajectory towards a low-risk and equitable level of
fossil energy flows from high consumption levels, reducing them over time until
they reach sustainable levels in terms of both ecology and equity. This may be called
the trajectory of contraction. Developing countries, on the other hand, start from
relatively low levels of fossil energy flows, increasing them over time until they
approach the trajectory of industrial countries at sustainable levels of resource
throughput. This may be called the trajectory of convergence. Each trajectory poses
related, but different, challenges. For industrial countries the challenge consists of
reducing resource flows. For developing countries, it consists of raising levels of
resource consumption at a much smaller gradient than industrial countries did
historically. Both trajectories will imply reduction commitments, at different levels
and at different times.
However, a more fundamental question may be whether the juxtaposition of
“developed” and “developing” countries still reflects social and economic realities.
In climate negotiations, states are being constructed as subjects of responsibility.
This puts climate policy firmly into the framework of what can be called “the
Westphalian constellation”. In this framework, the world of nation-states, which
came into existence after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, was seen as a series of
containers, which hold a society and all its layers within a territorially bounded
space. As these containers burst open with globalisation, some of the
“Westphalian” assumptions become more and more fictitious. Related to climate
policy, we will address the assumptions of internal homogeneity, of equivalence
between states, and of states as sovereign actors.
First, since states are regarded as equivalent, their emissions are being considered
equivalent. However, as has been pointed out by Agarwal/Narain (1991), the
aggregation of equivalent emissions conceals the fact that they are of a very different
social quality. Methane emissions from the rice fields of subsistence farmers in the
Philippines and carbon emissions from the exhausts of US four-wheel sport utility
vehicles are similar in their biophysical effect, but drastically different in their social
content. Lumping subsistence emissions together with luxury emissions is hardly
fair (Shue 1993), but it is common practice. Along with the socially neutralising
effect of aggregating carbon emissions with non-carbon emissions in the basket
approach, this statistical abstraction plays out in favour of high carbon emitting
countries.
Second,  assuming that states are relatively homogenous internally shields the fact
that huge disparities among social classes exist within states.  Affluent groups within
industrialising countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, India or China, use about as much
energy and materials as their counterparts in the industrialised world, which implies
a level five to ten times higher than the average consumption in these countries
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(Siddiqi 1995). As “Omnivores” (Gadgil-Guha 1995), just as their Northern
counterparts, they are in the position to capture resources at the expense of the social
majority. If the “polluter pays” principle were applied not to states, but to members
of the global middle class, then most of the Southern middle classes would have to
accept reduction commitments already today. At any rate, the trajectories of
contraction and convergence also apply to the development paths of different social
classes within countries.
Third, the focus on states as responsible actors obscures the fact that other entities,
namely transnational corporations, may be at times more responsible for emissions
than states. After all, among the 100 largest economies in the world today, there are
only 49 countries, but 51 companies (Anderson-Cavanagh 1997). Comparing
company emissions to country emissions yields interesting results. For example,
British Petroleum’s operational emissions surpass easily those of a country like
Belgium, while its production accounts for emissions that surpass those of its home
country, Britain. Oil produced by Shell alone emits more carbon dioxide than most
countries in the world, including Canada, Brazil, France, Australia and Spain, while
those of Exxon Mobil equal some 80% of those from all of Africa (Bruno et al.
1999, 7).
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4 How should allowances be allocated?
The Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have embarked upon the creation of a new
“commodity” – the allowance to emit a certain amount of GHGs within a certain
timeframe. In this way, an “initial allocation” of emission allowances has already
taken place for the industrialised countries listed in Annex B. This rather arbitrary
allocation of “assigned amounts” to industrialised countries follows the so-called
“grandfathering rule”, i.e. emission allowances are derived from historic emission
levels (generally the base year 1990). As highlighted by China, India and other
developing countries, starting from the status quo can hardly be seen as equitable, if
applied to their own emissions.
According to the three principles developed by Thompson/Rayner (1998) for
resolving practical problems at making fair allocation of resources, industrialised
countries have thus claimed “priority”: first in time, first in right. It is a pragmatic
principle, derived from water laws and adapted to the international arena of
Realpolitik. The other two principles are more complex – proportionality, i.e. the
distribution of benefits according to criteria like rank, contribution or need, and
parity, the egalitarian principle of equal rights to all claimants. The latter has gained
considerable support in the South, but also among researchers in the North. India,
for example, submitted language before COP 6 that equity between North and South
should include “equity with respect to per capita greenhouse gas emissions, so as
not to perpetuate existing inequities …” (Doc. FCCC/SB/1999/8, para.149 (b)).
Brazil, in the run-up to Kyoto, presented calculations based on historical per-capita
emissions (FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.1/Add.3). Also the above mentioned
“contraction and convergence” approach is supposed to lead towards equal per
capita emissions (The Corner House 1997; GCI 1999; Baumert et al. 1999). Under
the convergence approach, equal per capita emissions would guide the allocation
procedure over the long-term, i.e. per capita emissions of the various countries
would converge to an amount considered to be sustainable.
Despite some claims that the egalitarian approach is the only ethically justifiable
method of allocation (Agarwal/Narain 1991; Grubb 1995), it is not without
problems. Industrialised countries do not start from scratch, but have locked
themselves into a fossil-based infrastructure, which cannot be dismantled in the short
and medium term. This may entitle them to a “bonus” for a first mover
disadvantage. On a more fundamental level, aiming at a world with equal GHG
emissions per capita – even only for a transition period – is about as attractive as
aiming for a world with equal GDP per capita. Any such standardisation is a threat
to diversity. While conventional development homogenised cultures in the name of
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the dollar, climate policy does not need to follow the same route while “rescuing the
world” from overdevelopment. Indeed, the egalitarian rule should not to be mistaken
as a planning objective for planetary redistribution. It is rather a moral principle
guiding an actor’s behaviour. Loosely paraphrasing the Kantian imperative, it makes
sense to say that a society can only be called sustainable if the maxim of its action is
such that it can be the maxim of every other society. Accordingly, the principle of
equal right of all people to the world’s resources is in the first place a yardstick for
the self-examination of each society, not a global planning norm.
In addition to ethical considerations outlined above, political realism will therefore
tend to lead towards a solution of “adjusted egalitarianism”. The contraction and
convergence approach offers a framework within which modifications can be
negotiated. This does not imply that egalitarian principles will be disregarded, but
merely that they will not be used to prescribe the necessary outcome (“equal per-
capita distribution of emission allowances”). Instead, egalitarianism may better serve
as a regulatory principle, a “Leitbild” that determines the direction and provides
guidance.
The long-standing debate on the fair differentiation of commitments between
industrialised countries (Torvanger et al. 1996) has shown that there are a number of
factors in addition to population size that need to be taken into account in order to
allocate GHG emissions on a national basis under a global limit. These include
geographical as well as climatic conditions, and strength and energy intensity of the
economy. Taking such criteria as a starting point has greatly helped the European
Union to finally agree on an internal “burden sharing”. Admittedly, however, the
final outcome looked very different from the initial allocation that was broadly based
on rational factors (Oberthür/Ott 1999, 143).
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5 Should there be trading of emissions?
When a given volume of GHG’s has been defined by an international agreement as
permissible over a certain period of time, emission allowances become, economically
speaking, scarce goods. As demand will be higher than supply, allowances will
command exchange value. This value will basically be determined by the size of
supply on the one hand and by the perceived utility of fossil-based combustion (in
the case of CO2) on the other. Where the threshold regulating the permissible
amount of global emissions is set depends on what kind of risk is politically
accepted over what period of time and for whom. The more inclusive the ethical
storyline adhered to; the lower will most likely be the level of risk accepted. And the
desire for combustion will, inter alia, depend on the extent to which a society has
embarked upon a sustainable development path; the more national income is
decoupled from carbon emissions and the more well-being from national income, the
less will be the pressure to emit.
Parcelling out shares of the global atmospheric commons to be exchanged among
trading partners appears to be strikingly similar to the enclosure of communal
forests in 18th century Europe. Just as the enclosures put in place both property
rights and forest protection, denying access for common people, the assignment of
emission permits ensures protection by granting property rights, eliminating
unregulated use by any player involved. Following this analogy, trade regimes have
been criticised for turning parts of the global commons into saleable pieces of
property, i.e. commodities (Belliveau 1998). Indeed, such a conception would clearly
contradict ethical narratives that see the atmosphere as common heritage of mankind,
as integral to the Earth’s bio-community, or as God’s creation. Possibly for these
reasons, the Indian government has demanded to ensure “that the Protocol has not
created any asset, commodity or goods for exchange” (Doc. FCCC/SB/1999/8,
para.149 f).
However, these objections would not hold if one considered the price of emission
permits not as a rent yielded by a property, but as a fee to be paid for the temporary
right to use the atmospheric commons beyond its sink capacity. In fact, the
temporary nature of permits along with the fact that a price tag will be attached not to
the use but to the overuse of the commons, suggests to interpret the price for a
permit not as a price for acquired property, but the price for obtaining a user right.
Money gives the right to access, but not to ownership.
Following this consideration, a trade in permits takes on a different meaning. It
would not be instituted in the first place for identifying the most efficient allocation
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of abatement investments, but for forming the price of user rights. After all, the
market, under conditions of relative symmetry among players, is the most ingenious
technology for determining prices.
Finally, however, who should own the revenue generated from the trade of permits?
The answer is usually “governments”, since it is governments that create permits
through joint action in the first place, and it is governments that receive payments for
permits sold. But from a commons point of view, it is undoubtedly humanity that
holds the biosphere in trust; all citizens equally share in the trusteeship of a
commonly inherited patrimony. It follows from this line of thought that the revenue
gained from issuing user rights belongs to all citizens; neither corporations nor
governments are as a matter of course entitled to appropriate the sky rent. For
dealing with this issue, the establishment of a Citizens Sky Trust has been proposed
on the national level (Barnes 1999), but on the international level, a discussion is
badly lacking.
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6 Should there be international trading of
allowances?
Broadly speaking, the Kyoto Protocol has been the outcome of two partly
contradictory negotiation objectives. On the one hand, there was the move towards
defining reduction commitments that are legally binding. On the other hand, there
was the ambition to maximise “flexibility” in all directions in realising these
commitments. Emissions trading is one of the three flexibility mechanisms in
principle agreed upon at Kyoto, along with Joint Implementation and the Clean
Development Mechanism. These still rudimentary defined mechanisms are the main
reason for the confusing outcome of Kyoto; they would increase economic
efficiency, but could undermine ecological effectiveness. Indeed, if the multiple
forms of “flexibility” were implemented without restrictions (considering in
addition the flexibility gained by including GHGs beyond carbon dioxide in the
reduction targets and the enlargement of sinks in the actions to fulfil the
commitments) CO2 emissions in the United States, Canada and Australia could rise
up to 20% above 1990 levels without breaching the letter of the Kyoto agreement
(Grubb 1999, 181). Along with the absence of caps for developing countries, these
provisions may lead to the ecologically perverse result that global carbon emissions
will continue to grow at much the same rate for years to come, Kyoto
notwithstanding.
What unites all three flexibility mechanisms is the intention to provide for
geographical flexibility in locating investments for mitigating climate change. Each
of these instruments allows Annex I-Parties to partly fulfil their obligation by
investing in reduction abroad, in developing countries or in economies in transition.
They have been introduced in the negotiations as measures to achieve emission
reductions at high economic efficiency, allowing capital to be allocated where an
additional amount of reduction can be achieved with the least amount of money. The
power of the argument lies in the fact that it carries the logic governing the current
wave of economic globalisation into the area of environmental policy. Just as under
NAFTA and WTO corporations are invited to scan the world across countries for
the most cost-effective investment opportunities, under the Kyoto provisions for
flexibility environmental policy makers are invited to look at the entire world as an
arena for cost-efficient mitigation investments. Both strategies converge in the
assumption that neither place nor community matter when it comes to investment
decisions. While economic deregulation limits the right of communities to protect
themselves against negative externalities, mitigation flexibility limits their right to
demand positive externalities. Both strategies attempt to “disembed” (K. Polanyi)
economic action from any specific society with its particular institutions and history.
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The consequence might be a perception that renders it futile to expect any
responsibility – be in a negative or in a positive sense – on part of business for the
common good of a particular society.
At this point, it may be helpful to distinguish two ways of understanding the global
responsibility of the North. In a globalist sense, it comes to mean that the
geographical scope of Northern responsibility has to be extended until it coincides
with the scope of its negative effects. Given that the effects of the North reach all the
way to the ends of the earth, its responsibility consequently has to be globalised. In a
cosmopolitan sense, however, it means that the global effects of the North have to be
reduced until they coincide with the circumscribed geographical scope of Northern
responsibility.  As global effects have their local origins mainly in the North,
responsible action therefore has to be local in the first place, relieving the burden
from other countries. The globalist notion of responsibility emphasises all-
competence for the sake of efficiency, while the cosmopolitan notion focuses on
self-limitation for the sake of a good global neighbourhood.
The tension between these two notions of responsibility lies behind the debate about
the extent to which “trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions”, as the
Kyoto Protocol states without further specification. Several objections have been
raised, in particular from the G77 and NGO’s, against too much space for fulfilling
commitments through international transfer rather than domestic action. The most
widely voiced fear is that industrialised countries would try to buy their way out of
their commitments. In essence, the opponents expect conversion of the sinner, not
just payment for damages. In their eyes, it is not enough that the polluter pays; the
polluter has got to change as well. “No reparation without re-socialisation” could
be their slogan. Indeed, those in favour of domestic action have a localised and
historical understanding of responsibility. For them, the causes of maldevelopment
have to be removed, not just its effects contained.
A similar debate arose in 1992 when a controversial World Bank Memorandum
argued that both exporting and importing countries can be made better off with a
flourishing trade in waste. Also in this case, the language of Pareto optimality
clashed with the language of responsibility (Linnerooth-Bayer 1999). Of course, the
rationale for the moral imperative of self-correction is the need to exit from the path
of maldevelopment. In this sense, sustainable development, not emission abatement
has to be the priority for industrialised economies. The principle of cost
minimisation underlying the concept of ET must be balanced against the generation
of sufficient pressures to change course towards long-term stabilisation of
cumulative emissions (Grubb et al. 1999, 193). Too much “flexibility” in the Kyoto
Protocol could thus relieve Western industrialised countries from the pressure to
initiate structural changes in their economy towards long-term technological and
societal innovation. It is for this reason likely that a failure to maintain
supplementarity would undermine the Convention’s principle of leadership by
Annex I-countries in mitigating climate change.
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7 Should there be restrictions on trading?
Emissions Trading as an instrument of international environmental policy is clearly
an offspring of the 1990s, after the political and ideological schism that had divided
the world for almost 50 years. It thus belongs to an era where, first, the Earth could
be viewed as one global playing field and where, second, economic efficiency has
surfaced as the common denominator linking the elites almost worldwide. This is
true also for Southern elites, mainly educated in Britain or the US (those educated in
Russia have been mostly quick to adhere to the new paradigm as well). However,
under certain circumstances, other values have the potential to disrupt the hegemony
of this concept.
One such challenge to the prevalence of economic efficiency is the demand for
ecological effectiveness. Both concepts must not necessarily exclude each other, but
they are by no means easily compatible in the nitty-gritty of real world
implementation. The principle of ecological effectiveness demands, for example, that
global GHG emissions must not be higher with Emissions Trading than without.
The “hot air” accumulated in the Eastern European Countries with Economies in
Transition (CEITs) presents a serious threat to this principle. Although emissions
under a trading regime including the hot air would not be higher than the “global
cap” established in Article 3.1 (minus roughly 5 percent of industrialised countries’
1990 emissions) nominally, factual emissions would be higher than they would be
without trading. This is because without trading the enormous “reductions”
achieved especially in Russia (minus 30 percent from 1990 levels) would be “lost”
and not emitted into the atmosphere. The biggest suppliers – Russia, the Ukraine
and Poland – may actually offer the equivalent of about 2 percent of global CO2
emissions for sale (Missfeldt 1998, 131).
The European Union has made an attempt to solve both problems (hot air and
supplementarity) with one instrument and proposed the introduction of quantitative
limits (“caps”) on both the seller and the buyer of emission allowances
(Oberthür/Ott 1999, 199 et seq.). According to their formula, the total amount of hot
air available from Eastern European sellers would, compared with business-as-usual
projections of the International Energy Agency, be reduced to about one-third. A
second cap on potential buyers would limit the ability of countries to acquire
emission allowances under another complicated formula. This was met with loud
and outright protest especially from the US who accused the EU of “trying to
rewrite the Protocol”.
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Balancing the demands of cost-effectiveness and the necessities of environmental
effectiveness might thus require taking a different path. One rather elegant
possibility is the proposal to charge a fee on all transactions under the trading
regime, possibly with different levels for intra-OECD as compared to other trading
activities (Tietenberg et al. 1998, 71). This would not preclude or limit the use of
Emissions Trading including hot air, but instead would raise the transaction costs of
trading, and thus improve the comparative advantage of taking domestic action to
reduce GHG emissions. A fee of US$ 5 per tonne of carbon equivalent, levied on
transfers of 300 Mt of carbon per year, might raise approximately US$ 1.5 billion
annually during the first commitment period (Grubb et al. 1999, 223).  
These resources might be used to assist developing countries in adapting to climate
change (Oberthür/Ott 1999, 309; Ott/Oberthür 1999, 27; see also the proposal of
AOSIS and other developing countries before COP 6, FCCC/SB/1999/8, para.157).
The CDM might serve as a precedent, which must use a “share of the proceeds” to
cover administrative expenses and certain costs of adaptation to climate change
impacts in developing countries. This option would thus have the additional
advantage of providing a more level playing field between the Kyoto Mechanisms.
Furthermore, much like a Tobin tax, it would have a calming effect on emission
markets. Given the long-lasting resistance by many industrialised countries to accept
international “taxation”, framing such a solution in a politically acceptable form
will, however, require some creativity and the support of some major industrialised
countries.
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8 Should emission allowances be obtainable
through JI and the CDM?
The other two flexibility mechanisms, Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), allow Annex I-Parties to receive emission credits
abroad on a project-by-project basis. While JI is confined to the industrialised
world, CDM involves non-Annex I-countries. In both cases, benefits are expected to
accrue to both project partners; the recipient country would receive additional funds,
modern technology and know-how, whereas the investing country would acquire
CO2 credits at a lower cost than taking action at home. However, what looks like a
win-win situation in theory, conceals a number of problems, some even of ethical
relevance.
First of all, both mechanisms rest on the idea of “environmental additionality”.
Since any project to be credited is supposed to generate climate change benefits,
which would not be available otherwise, it becomes crucial to draw a line between
“normal” and “additional” projects.  A so-called baseline scenario has to be
determined against which the specially achieved emission reductions can be
calculated. However, it is neither possible nor desirable to normalise a development
path. It is not possible because in the medium and long run there is likely to be a
plurality of baselines, all of which with different implications in terms of climate
policy (IPCC 2000). Countries are not likely to follow a pre-stabilised course; in
what direction they move will depend on resource endowment, socio-economic
conditions, relations of power, and cultural outlooks.
Moreover, normalising development is not desirable because development is a
contested terrain, not just on the national, also on the international level. What
development path, one might ask? In a divided world, drifting into biospherical
turbulences, this is probably the most prominent question in social ethics. Any
government today is called upon to move towards pro-poor and pro-nature
development styles, regardless of flexibility mechanisms. A country, for example,
which for reasons of equity promotes biodiversity habitats, resource-light
production, livelihood agriculture or the institution of community rights, may already
avoid a great deal of emissions, over and above any “additionality”. Defining a
baseline, all the more so in treaties with international partners, is therefore rather
counterproductive for each country’s search for sustainability; such a definition
would most likely codify the dominating, conventional view of development. This
will be particularly the case as both the receiver and the investor countries have a
vested interest in assuming a business-as-usual baseline. The more conventional the
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baseline, the more additional funds or credits, respectively, can be recovered from the
flexibility operation.
Second, investors under JI and CDM will be inclined “to pick the low-hanging
fruits first”. Emission abatement with a low marginal cost – which comes cheap, in
other words – is likely to be harvested away early, with the credits going to the high-
emitting countries. Two effects can be discerned. First, receiving countries sell off
easy reduction possibilities at an early date, while themselves being left with the
more expensive reductions later on. Second, investor countries have little incentive to
undertake restructuring at home; running the danger to get further locked into a
fossil development path.
Third, not too many Southern countries will be considered worthy of CDM
investments by Annex I-countries. As credits through the CDM can be reaped
easiest in newly-industrialising countries which have already embarked upon a
fossil-based energy path, most of the funds are likely to flow into 10-15 “emerging
markets”, reinforcing the actual distribution of private investment flows. In other
words, resource transfer will happen not according to need, but according to
planetary utility. In particular if the CDM partly replaces development aid, a pattern
of redistribution could emerge which privileges environmental hot spots at the
expense of globally less relevant countries. In this case, the CDM would reveal its
seamy side, turning out to be an instrument for rich countries for both keeping
competitors for biospherical space at bay and seizing more of this space.
In sum, opening the possibility to obtain credits for trading through JI and the CDM
would likely backfire in terms of sustainability and equity. On the other hand, of
course, the CDM can be seen as a way to meet the concern of the FCCC that Annex
I-countries should assist developing countries financially and technologically in
dealing with climate change. A way out of this dilemma could be to strictly focus the
CDM on assisting non-Annex I-countries in the transition to a non-carbon economy
(Agarwal/Narain 2000). Under such a scheme, only carbon-free energy, such as
solar, biomass, wind, and hydro, would be promoted through CDM activities. Such
an approach would definitely not be an easy low-cost option, but it is in synergy
with sustainable development in the South, it favours non-carbon energy technology
in the North, and, it is evidently the only viable long-term ecological solution.   
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